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Abstract 
This paper critically analyses a contradictory phenomenon experienced by local-level conflict 
resolution initiatives in Israel and Palestine. Despite their widespread utilization in other 
contexts of inter-communal conflict, facilitated contact interventions, including citizen 
dialogue and arranged encounters between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, are being rejected 
and publicly denounced by many within the Palestinian and Israeli conflict resolution 
community in this case. This paper contributes to an understanding of this rejection by 
investigating arguments in favour of and against planned contact intervention initiatives 
through an analysis of interview narratives from 40 respondents working for peace and conflict 
resolution organisations in Israel and the West Bank as well as secondary research reports. Our 
analysis reveals deeply conflicting viewpoints. Arguments in favour of contact-based strategies 
suggest that they have the potential to disrupt an entrenched status quo of asymmetry-inspired 
social segregation. Conversely, arguments against suggest that these conflict resolution 
initiatives are struggling to level power asymmetry and bypass the structural and historical 
drivers of violence. In response, this paper introduces a grounded proposal for conflict 
resolution inside asymmetric conflict that emerges from the interview narratives of 
practitioners, themselves, regarding effective strategies, the nature of agency, and the scope of 
influence of local-level contact-based conflict resolution initiatives inside asymmetric conflict. 
Keywords 







Planned intergroup contact interventions in Israel and Palestine have been broadly 
promoted as fundamental components to bottom-up conflict resolution initiatives because of 
their perceived capabilities to counteract the failure of official peace negotiations and 
agreements, reconstruct individual and group identities, reduce prejudice and hostility, and 
increase the odds of sustainable peaceful coexistence in the future (Abu-Nimer, 2004, 2012; 
Maoz, 2002, 2003; Pundak, Ben-Nun, & Finkel, 2012; Ron, Maoz, & Bekerman, 2010; 
Steinberg & Bar-On, 2002). However, facilitated contact-based conflict resolution initiatives 
are being widely rejected in Israel and Palestine. For example, in 2014 Palestinian anti-
normalization activists publicly disrupted, stalled and dispersed participants at two peace 
conferences involving Jewish Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank city of Ramallah and 
in East Jerusalem. Principled objections to joint meetings have ground many local-level 
conflict resolution projects to a halt, and dialogue initiatives between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians have become quite rare at the current juncture. While objections to contact have 
emerged from within both Palestinian and Jewish Israeli societies, the scope and intensity of 
the objection to contact interventions varies. Objections are widespread, public and forceful 
within Palestinian society, and are correlated to growing contention with the aftereffects of the 
1993 Oslo Accords. Objections within Jewish Israeli society are mostly limited to a small 
subset of younger more ‘radical’ activist organizations, including both left-leaning human 
rights organizations and right-wing nationalist organizations. This public resistance and 
castigation points to a growing debate within the Israeli and Palestinian conflict resolution 
community over the contradictions of contact-based conflict resolution practices (Barakat & 
Goldenblatt, 2012, p. 25). 
Existing research literature only superficially recognizes the contradictions of planned 





connected contact and dialogue to the overarching asymmetrical political conflict (Abu-Nimer, 
2012; Francis, 2010; Halabi & Sonnenschein, 2004; Maoz, 2011; Selby, 2003), while social 
psychological research has only just begun to explore these interventions in relation to other 
avenues of social and political change such as collective action (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & 
Durrheim, 2012; Saguy, 2017; Wright & Baray, 2012). In neither body of research has the 
reasoning behind this rejection of contact been explicitly theorized. In response, the present 
research contributes to an understanding of this contradictory phenomenon and investigates 
how those closest to the action, conflict resolution practitioners who are either active 
participants in, or resistors against, contact-based conflict resolution practices, theorize the 
contradictions of contact interventions in Israel and Palestine.  
This article proceeds by first surveying the theoretical background that situates the 
practice of planned contact interventions in the ongoing debates within the social psychological 
and conflict resolution literature over the validity of the contact hypothesis and the 
contradictions of conflict resolution action inside asymmetric conflict. Against this backdrop, 
our research methods are outlined, followed by a presentation of findings that begins with the 
viewpoint that planned contact interventions are constructive at the current juncture. Critical 
responses to contact-based strategies are presented next, with special reference to their apparent 
inability to either level power asymmetry or attend to the roots of ongoing violence and 
injustice. The final discussion and conclusions sections construct and examine a grounded 






Theoretical background: Planned contact interventions inside asymmetric conflict 
Planned contact interventions 
Planned contact interventions such as citizen dialogue, reconciliation and healing 
sessions, micro-negotiations, joint schooling and training, social, sports and cultural events, 
and economic and development cooperation are widely used by conflict resolution 
organizations as strategic initiatives in response to protracted social conflict and intergroup 
violence in Palestine (Abu-Nimer, 2004, 2012; Dessel & Rogge, 2008; Maoz, 2000a, 2002, 
2003; Ramsbotham, 2010; Ron, et al., 2010; Steinberg & Bar-On, 2002). Widely utilized in 
other contexts of intercommunal violence including between Catholics and Protestants in 
Northern Ireland and between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, planned contact interventions 
(often labelled ‘people-to-people’ activities) in Israel and Palestine were first initiated in the 
1970s and 1980s, often as high-risk ventures for facilitators and participants, which evolved 
into a flood of internationally-funded contact-based conflict resolution activity after the 
Palestine Liberation Organization adopted a two-state platform in 1988 and the promotion of 
cross-communal contact after the 1993 Oslo Accords (Herzog & Hai, 2005).  
A growing body of research and evaluation literature has shown that planned contact 
interventions in Israel and Palestine are modifying individual perceptions of the ‘other’ (Abu-
Nimer, 2012; Maoz, 2000a; Steinberg & Bar-On, 2002), encouraging multiple perspectives and 
deepening understandings of conflict (Khuri, 2004), reconstructing individual identities (Maoz, 
Steinberg, Bar-On, & Fakhereldeen, 2002) and motivating sustained participation in further 
conflict resolution ventures (Lazarus, 2011). More broadly, research has evidenced that 
intergroup contact facilitates the re-imagination of in-groups boundaries and category 
memberships (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005; Wright & Lubensky, 2009), allow 





trust and empathy (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008), and shape in-group norms and customs in 
relation to outgroups (Pettigrew, 1998, p. 71). Transformational influence is directional – 
flowing from micro-individual to macro-institutional-political levels – which requires a 
consistent focus on historically advantaged groups as the primary agents of change in creating 
a more peaceful society (Dixon, et al., 2012, p. 418; Wright & Baray, 2012). These outcomes 
were predicted by Allport’s ‘contact hypothesis’, which proposed that competing ethnic or 
national groups would be able to reduce hostility and develop positive perceptions of their 
adversaries through structured encounters (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969). 
However, these positive findings are ostensibly dissonant with the principled rejection 
of such activities in Israel and Palestine. There currently exists scant empirical research that 
considers the principled rejection of planned contact interventions - conflict resolution 
literature on planned contact interventions has, for the most part, limited itself to the internal 
dynamics of group dialogue sessions, and social psychological research on contact and 
prejudice reduction has only begun to move out of idealized contexts (e.g. between equal status 
groups) and consider the manner in which intergroup encounters can undermine other avenues 
of social and political change (Dixon, et al., 2012; Saguy, 2017; Saguy & Dovidio, 2013; 
Wright & Lubensky, 2009). The present study expands these debates by shifting the focus of 
analysis out of group contact sessions and into ‘non-ideal’ contexts by considering how conflict 
resolution practitioners theorize this rejection of planned contact interventions in relation to the 
protracted asymmetrical conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinians. 
Asymmetric conflict, power and oppression 
Conflict resolution literature reveals a hesitancy to consider the stature and efficacy of 
various conflict resolution prescriptions in relation to asymmetric social and political conflict 





the overarching socio-political reality in contexts of asymmetric conflict (Francis, 2010; 
Hansen, 2008; Mitchell, 1991; Ramsbotham, 2017; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011).  
While taking into account some notable exceptions (See for e.g. Abu-Nimer, 2012; Azar & 
Farah, 1981; Maoz, 2000c; Rouhana & Korper, 1997), this predilection is important to note 
since the dynamics of entrenched power and structural asymmetry unmistakably endorse and 
define violent conflict as experienced by Jewish Israelis and Palestinians (Arreguin-Toft, 
2001). The consequences of decision-making undertaken within this sort of conflict resolution 
paradigm are significant since power and structural asymmetry tend to direct conflict into 
‘malign spiral[s] of interaction’ between competing parties (Mitchell, 1991, p. 28). Engaging 
with these asymmetry-inspired spiralling interactions requires conflict resolution practitioners 
to reconsider any expectations that competitors will abide by the predictable patterns of 
(re)action typical in contexts of symmetric power (Pruitt, 1998; Ramsbotham, 2017). 
A conceptualization of ‘power asymmetry’ benefits from Boulding’s (1990) description 
of threat power, or the coercive authority to enforce sanctions with violence; and economic 
power, which is embodied by resource advantages garnered from exchange and trade processes 
(Atack, 2012). Threat and economic power exertion are fundamentally drawn to domination 
and subordination inside hierarchy and, in the case of Israel and Palestine, depend upon legal 
and structural dimensions to asymmetric ethno-nationalist conflict. Legal asymmetry ensures 
the dominant party’s advantage by allowing it to define the situation, dictate the status and 
legitimacy of its competitors, and select the tools to prosecute the conflict (Mitchell, 1991). 
Structural asymmetry, meanwhile, allows a dominant party to define which issues are 
consequential in a conflict and to force their concerns onto political agendas for action. 
Structural asymmetry is also defined by differential abilities to ‘survive’ the conflict and 
mobilize intra-communal cohesion (Mitchell, 1991). Legal and structural asymmetry in 





2013; Hansen, 2008), and are widely identified as central to the Palestinian social and political 
experience. 
The de-politicization of conflict resolution and the interpersonal turn 
In their encounter with asymmetry-inspired oppression and occupation, contact-based 
conflict resolution practice has, arguably, found it beneficial to de-politicize its activities and 
re-direct its focus onto addressing interpersonal issues. At least two strands of reasoning for 
this shift are specified in the conflict resolution and social psychology literature. First, conflict 
resolution practitioners continue to test the utility of contact activities engendered by Allport’s 
contact hypothesis. Of particular concern is Maoz’s (2000b) critique that the predictions of the 
contact hypothesis have not been fully confirmed in cases of actual asymmetrical ethno-
political conflict. Maoz and others question the applicability of the hypothesis to planned 
contact interventions in contexts like Israel and Palestine, and argue that the structural 
dynamics of the external conflict do penetrate planned contact activities and significantly 
compromise interactions therein (Abu-Nimer, 2012; Maoz, 2000c; Pettigrew, 1998; Rouhana 
& Korper, 1997). Of particular concern is that this seepage of external asymmetrical socio-
structural dynamics (Rouhana & Fiske, 1995) into contact activities contravenes Allport’s 
essential condition that attitudinal and behavioural changes rely upon perceptions of equal 
status within the contact interaction (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). 
Facilitators of planned contact interventions that have recognized this phenomenon are 
faced with difficult decisions, and have sometimes chosen to divert interactions away from 
expressions of dissent by weaker groups (Maoz, 2000c), avoid ‘political’ discussions (Abu-
Nimer, 2012; Eide, 1972; Maoz, 2000b; Phipps, 2014; Rouhana & Korper, 1997), and channel 
interactions towards commonalities and/or cooperative ventures as opposed to the overarching 





dominant role, or any threat to the privileged position of Jewish Israeli participants (Saguy & 
Dovidio, 2013). Bypassing the ‘political’ has, in part, motivated a growing critique of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding initiatives in Israel and Palestine as pre-occupied with achieving 
‘normalization’, a process that aims to project occupation-inspired oppression as ‘normal’ and 
a reality that must be consented to and tolerated by local populations (Barakat & Goldenblatt, 
2012; Mi'Ari, 1999; Salem, 2005). 
Second, some scholars argue that conflict resolution research and practice tend to 
identify with and serve the interests of groups conceived to be powerful (Carroll, 1972; Eide, 
1972; Hansen, 2008). For example, Schmid (1968) details conflict resolution’s tendency to 
support ‘power’ in maintaining the oppressive status quo in political conflicts. This critique 
builds on an ongoing debate within conflict resolution scholarship as to its relationship with 
‘the establishment’ and particularly with national governments (Rapoport, 1970; Stohl & 
Chamberlain, 1972).  Stohl & Chamberlain (1972) believe that this critique centres on 
competing conceptions of peace because ‘it is necessary to decide whether by peace you mean 
social justice or social stability (p. 527).’ Are, then, conflict resolution activities suppressing 
conflict to serve the interests of oppressive but stabilizing power structures? 
Jabri (1995, p. 53) argues that conflict resolution practice has, in fact, often served ‘the 
establishment’, which has necessitated the de-politicization of conflict resolution action and 
‘the extraction of the conflict resolution setting from its social and political context’ (Jabri, 
2006, p. 5). This de-politicization of conflict resolution theory and practice has important 
implications for planned contact interventions inside contexts of asymmetric conflict because 
it has led to the prioritization of interpersonal peace formation over more encompassing forms 
of justice. A fixation on addressing conflict at the interpersonal level constitutes an 
‘interpersonal turn’ and reifies behavioural analyses of conflict as it evades of the messy task 





2012; Eide, 1972; Galtung, 1996, p. 280; Phipps, 2014; Rouhana & Korper, 1997). A notable 
consequence of prioritizing interpersonal peace over systemic justice is a tendency to 
conceptualize and operationalize conflict resolution as a process of de-escalation inside 
asymmetric conflict (Lederach, 1995a). Numerous scholars equate externally sponsored de-
escalation as ‘riot control’, which serves to pacify insubordinate populations and reinforce the 
oppressive status quo and ensure hegemonic stability (Duffield, 2001; Francis, 2010; Stohl & 
Chamberlain, 1972; Turner, 2015). 
Reconsidering conflict resolution in contexts of asymmetric conflict 
The de-politicization of conflict resolution theory and practice and its penchant for de-
escalating surface expressions of conflict have, in part, inspired a revisionist movement and 
conceptual paradigm shift, broadly labelled as ‘conflict transformation’, that features efforts to 
leverage forms of conflict intensification inside contexts of asymmetric conflict (Galtung, 
1996; Lederach, 1995b; Thiessen, 2017). A key theoretical justification for this paradigm shift 
lies in a reconsideration of Adam Curle’s (1971) model for the progression of conflict in 
unbalanced relationships, which proposed that conflict resolution must first equalize 
unbalanced power dynamics inside conflicting relationships through confrontation before 
conciliatory settlements can be achieved. 
A revised conflict resolution enterprise based on Curle’s ideas affirms the constructive 
potential of conflict as a natural social process that serves distinct political functions 
(Kriesberg, 2015; Lederach, 1995b). Similar affirmations have begun to surface within social 
psychological research – researchers are contradicting common conceptualizations of 
intergroup conflict as a social problem or an ‘absolute bad’ (Dixon, et al., 2012, p. 423). To 
clarify, social psychological and conflict resolution research has tended to neglect the 





resolution practice can exhibit biases towards problem-solving approaches that shy away from 
altering the basic nature of conflicting relationships and suppress political violence in a manner 
that ultimately maintains the advantaged position of powerful parties (Richmond, 2004; 
Vayrynen, 1991), confer or secure international legitimacy for power advantage and, in many 
cases, does this by ‘dressing up domination as “cooperation”’ (Selby, 2003, p. 121). 
In contrast, Curle proposes that conflict resolution practice inside systems of power 
asymmetry should not be distracted with how conflict is presented, but endeavour towards the 
structural modification of power relationships. Conflict resolution, operationalized as a process 
of structural change and power re-distribution, channels manifestations of conflict into peace 
processes that feature the pursuit of justice by digging beneath surface manifestations of 
conflict and revealing its structural roots. This process aligns with realizations within social 
psychological research that advantaged groups within conflict rarely give away their power 
and privileges but, rather, equality and justice is achieved through struggle by subordinate 
groups (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). 
Adjusting power inside imbalanced relationships will require mobilized struggle and 
collective action by disempowered groups to destabilize the status quo (Schmid, 1968). 
Equality and justice are won as opposed to being gifted by advantaged groups as the result of 
improved intergroup attitudes from contact interventions (Dixon, et al., 2012, p. 419). As a 
result, Dudouet (2006) proposes that conflict resolution needs to embrace confrontation and 
the intensification of conflict. Understanding and utilizing civil conflict intensification requires 
the integration of social movement/resistance theory with conflict resolution theory, a move 
that works to ‘turn [conflict resolution] away from its problem-solving, status quo, 
pacification/system maintenance orientation’ (Jackson, 2015, p. 21). For example, there is 
growing evidence that unarmed collective action against a violent adversary inside an 





subordination towards elevated self-confidence, unity and social capital leading to group 
formation and mobilization (Darweish & Rigby, 2015; Dudouet, 2008; Nanetti, 2017), trigger 
power shifts to coerce or convince an opponent to accommodate demands (Chenoweth & 
Stephan, 2011; Dudouet, 2008; Schock, 2013), and leverage influential external parties to 
amplify key demands (Darweish & Rigby, 2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The effectiveness of 
unarmed collective action has been linked to Boulding’s (1990, p. 25) third type of power – 
‘integrative power’, or the power of consent, which recognizes that a power-holder’s ability to 
maintain legitimacy is conditional on the loyalty of subordinates (Atack, 2012, p. 103). 
Our theoretical background has featured two lines of social psychological and conflict 
resolution practice and research – the theoretical individualism of planned contact interventions 
and the structural focus of collective action and resistance. These two lines of inquiry appear 
to be inherently contradictory (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, 2017; Saguy, 
Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). For example, Wright and Lubensky (2009, p. 298) conclude 
that ‘contact appears to create a direct impediment to the development and maintenance of 
critical conditions necessary for collective action’. They reason that blurred intergroup 
boundaries, positive feelings towards outgroups and diminished perceptions of inequality due 
to contact interventions contravened the necessity of clear intergroup boundaries and strong 
negative beliefs regarding intergroup injustice for collective action to occur (Wright & 
Lubensky, 2009). But, more fundamentally, both conflict resolution and emerging social 
psychological research recognize that contact interventions promote intergroup harmony, in 
part, by viewing conflict as a negative social force that should be prevented and ‘resolved’, 
whereas resistant collective action requires intensified conflict through which social and 
political change for equality and justice is realized (Dudouet, 2008; Schock, 2013; Wright & 





Planned contact interventions and resistant collective action have been awkward 
cohabitants in Israel and Palestine, and have been justified as complementary paths toward 
sustainable peace and intergroup harmony. The provocative analysis surveyed above casts this 
viewpoint into doubt and proposes that contact interventions may, in fact, be undermining other 
avenues of social and political change. The present study contributes to the investigation of this 
theoretical provocation and brings the collective voice of conflict resolution practitioners, 
themselves, to bear on the rigorous analysis of contact-based initiatives.  How do conflict 
resolution practitioners theorize their experiences of planned contact interventions? 
Method 
Research design 
This research is a grounded theory investigation, and was conceived of and developed in 
collaboration with leaders from nine Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations in 2013, 
who identified the controversy over planned contact interventions and helped shape the 
contours of the research theme and final research design. We settled on an interview guide that 
inquired about experiences of contact-based interventions, including partners, target groups, 
achievements, struggles, transformational potential, and external supports and threats including 
issues of power, the overarching political conflict and the official peace process.  
Research population and data gathering 
This research relies upon data gathered through a series of 40 face-to-face semi-
structured interviews conducted with leaders from 17 Israeli, 16 Palestinian (from the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem and Israel) and seven international organizations. Sampling was 
purposive - aimed at capturing a cross section of perspectives on contact interventions defined 
by key inclusion criteria: the location of organization headquarters, respondents’ ethnicities 





respondents were selected while we analysed our data to elaborate on gaps in the proposal we 
construct and present later in this paper. Nineteen men and 14 women were interviewed (three 
interviews had two respondents), of a variety of ages (18+ years). Organizations included 20 
local NGOs (headquarters in Israel or Palestine), five international NGOs, five educational 
institutions, four other civil society groups, four research/consulting organizations and two 
international donors. All respondents had significant experience working with contact 
interventions (e.g. as a donor or facilitator) or had significant experience as a critical observer 
of contact-based initiatives while active in conflict resolution or resistant collective action. 
Interview data was gathered during 2014 and 2015 on four trips to Israel and the West 
Bank by the authors and an Israeli research assistant. Our tri-ethnic research team allowed most 
participants to use their mother tongue (Arabic, English or Hebrew), and helped to reduce 
cultural barriers for respondents when engaging with controversial themes. Most interviews 
were audio recorded, with the remainder documented through detailed notes. Interviewing was 
terminated when significant repetition emerged across the various interview narratives. We 
have tried to ensure the anonymity of all respondents. 
Interview data were complemented by a variety of secondary documentary sources 
which were selected according to their direct relevance to the research themes. Sources 
included ten research reports, three published interview transcripts, five project evaluations and 
nine evidence-based commentaries on planned contact interventions. All secondary data was 
produced after the 1993 Oslo Accords. 
Data analysis 
Audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and submitted along with the detailed 
interview notes and secondary sources to data analysis using NVivo. Data analysis procedures 





the identification of core explanatory categories to explain beliefs and behaviours regarding 
contact-based strategies through open coding, followed by selective coding to populate core 
categories. When identifying these codes, we did not sort respondents into ‘advocates’ or 
‘critics’, but recognized complex viewpoints where respondents both advocate for and criticize 
contact interventions. Thus, when we refer to a ‘critic’ or ‘advocate’ in the discussion below, 
we are referencing specific statements made by a respondent, and not applying an all-
encompassing label to the respondent. Further, although we have not quantified exactly our 
reporting of categories and codes, we have indicated in a couple places the number of coded 
references for overarching categories regarding the type of organization the respondent worked 
for (international, Israeli or Palestinian) to illustrate broad trends in viewpoints inside a context 
defined by asymmetric competition. We have also conscientiously featured categories 
containing the highest numbers of coded references while allowing those with fewer references 
to nuance major categories, where appropriate.   
Our grounded theory strategy also shaped how we report our research. As examples, 
continual memo-writing facilitated a process of theory development (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
as presented later in this paper, and we constructed the majority of our theoretical background 
after data was analysed in order to better accentuate the viewpoints of our respondents. In 2017 
we validated our interpretation of these viewpoints by presenting our research findings and 
theoretical propositions at four events in Israel and the West Bank where peace and conflict 
resolution practitioners and donors provided feedback. 
Findings 
Arguments in favour of planned contact interventions 
A subset of the interview narratives and research literature we reviewed advocate for 





Israel and the Palestinians. Approximately two-thirds of the coded references from our 
interview data in this section are from respondents working for organizations based in Israel, 
while international and Palestinian organizations evidenced more limited reflection on these 
themes. Responses are described below in terms of change inside three concentric social realms 
– individual, group and elite-political. 
Individual awakening. Research respondents believed that contact-based initiatives 
were effective conflict resolution tools that can motivate personal-psychological adaptation. A 
range of personal-level activity was justified by participants, ranging from superficial 
information-sharing to the deeper psychological process of humanization. Several interviewees 
expanded on the way planned contact interventions can dislodge the asymmetric status quo. 
For example, numerous participants working for Israeli organizations suggested that 
information exchange during dialogue sessions created awareness and respect for opposing 
narratives, revealed misinformation and bias, bolstered truthful and critical conversations and 
enabled deeper experiential understandings of an exceedingly complex context. 
Research respondents also described how dialogue sessions and personal encounters 
generate deep emotional experiences for individual participants; ones that motivate a variety 
of personal changes including relationship-building, increased cooperation, and commitments 
to advocacy. One Israeli participant shared a memory of sitting with grieving members of the 
opposing group to discuss the common experience of losing a family member to the conflict. 
Several respondents insisted that these sorts of emotionally moving experiences resulted in a 
reduction of fear in many individuals. They pointed out that fear can motivate suspicion, 
segregation and support for self-protecting violence. 
Conversely, a reduction of fear and ignorance allows planned contact participants to 
humanize ‘the other’. For example, several West Bank respondents attested that their 





soldiers and settlers due to stringent controls on movement. A West Bank Palestinian 
respondent working for an international organization noted her own response to those limits 
and the stereotypes they engender: 
‘I see the Israeli as a person with a gun at a checkpoint, and the Israeli sees the 
Palestinian as cheap labour. They don’t see the human side… [it becomes] easier to kill 
the other.’ 
In her view, contact allows competitors to see the human side of the ‘other’ and revise 
conceptions of their ‘enemy’. 
Group change. Research respondents described how planned contact interventions 
contribute to broader communal explorations of how competing populations can live side-by-
side in peace. Contact-based conflict resolution strategies have the potential to disrupt an 
entrenched status quo of asymmetry-inspired social segregation whereby interactions between 
competing populations are restrained by fear and restricted to functional encounters such as 
business transactions or conversations at checkpoints. 
Several Jewish Israeli respondents justified the value of engineering insulated ‘bubble’ 
environments, where small competing groups can model trust and the possibility of 
constructive interaction. Our respondents believed that inside many planned encounters a 
microcosm of equality is realized and that this is subversive inside asymmetric conflict since 
these encounters encapsulate, however fleetingly, the characteristics of ‘hoped-for’ peaceful 
coexistence. One leader in a cross-communal school in Israel stated that: 
‘Basically, our purpose in building the school is to have an island here in this region of 
conflict, where students can come to a safe place and interact with each other, form 
bridges between people and cultures.’ 
Other research participants believed that the safe space within dialogue encounter groups 





these activities can be subversive of asymmetry as opinions expressed in safety are detached 
from the constraints of external power structures and shielded from the social pressures of 
everyday life. This detachment allows participants to experience, understand and validate the 
reality of competing social narratives as they develop novel solutions and allow previously 
suppressed viewpoints to gain traction. 
Elite-political transformation. Some participants viewed the personal and communal 
transformations described above as constituent of a broader transformative political project – 
a local turn in the peace process aimed at wider inclusion of citizen political action. The 
interview narratives reveal that official peace process negotiations, including the Oslo Accords, 
are popularly viewed as having been conducted in bad faith and unable to activate meaningful 
change on the ground. Some respondents believed that planned contact interventions return 
agency to the local level by bypassing self-interested political elites and their interest in 
maintaining the asymmetric status quo. Several described how political elites have become 
disconnected from struggles at the local level, actively suppress local initiatives, and then find 
themselves unable to kindle a critical mass of citizen discussion on key issues. In this context, 
a Palestinian NGO leader cited the popular slogan which suggests that ‘Peace is too dear to be 
left to politicians only’. Several respondents argued that dialogue-based strategies can engage 
a comprehensive range of stakeholders and reduce local-level hopelessness by channelling 
adversaries into constructive conflict resolution processes. 
However, our research participants did not propose abandoning political peace 
processes and argued that widespread sustainable change is dependent upon the constructive 
involvement of elite actors. For example, two Israeli civil society respondents proposed that 
the achievements of planned encounters could be ‘scaled up’ to ensure impact on future peace 





solutions. An Israeli school leader argued that, ‘if you educate “influencers”, then eventually 
there will be change.’ 
Arguments against planned contact interventions 
The viewpoints summarized in the preceding section were fundamentally critiqued by 
other respondents who cautioned against the use of contact-based strategies at the current 
juncture and justified the growing objection to planned contact interventions in Israel and 
Palestine. Approximately 40% of the coded references from the interview data in this section 
are from respondents working for Palestinian organizations, with the remaining references 
divided almost equally between international and Israeli organizations. 
Bypassing the needs of oppressed local populations. Many of our respondents believed 
that planned contact interventions, as currently envisioned and funded by international donors, 
are not addressing the needs of local conflict-affected populations but, rather, the self-interests 
of other actors. As an example, respondents argued that funding decisions made by 
international governmental donors are based upon the self-interests of their respective 
commissioning governments (and their constituencies) including their economic and political 
relations with the State of Israel and its citizens. Thus, the interview narratives reveal 
perceptions that the injection of international donor money for contact-based strategies has 
diminished the feasibility of locally owned and prioritized practices. Lines of accountability 
have become inverted as donor-driven agendas reflect external agendas in relation to the State 
of Israel as opposed to the needs of local Israeli and Palestinian populations. As an example, 
the director of an international peace organization described how the EU’s Partnership for 
Peace (P4P) program has dictated project design by, for instance, insisting upon joint Israeli-





Second, the resource injections provided by international donors have served to create 
a distinct ‘dialogue industry’ in Israel and Palestine (Compare with Richmond (2004)).1 An 
international peace worker described this as comprising a cohort of dialogue facilitators who 
have collectively initiated and implemented large numbers of dialogue projects in the post-
Oslo Accord period. Further, some respondents believed that there is an accompanying cohort 
of dialogue participants who are often simply rotating between various initiatives, and this 
limits the reach of the dialogue industry. The emergence of a bounded set of dialogue-based 
conflict resolution methods, which have become the norm within the ‘industry’, may 
additionally be preventing the use of other forms of conflict resolution including popular 
collective action. According to a few respondents, this inherent friction with popular collective 
action ultimately serves to maintain the status quo of asymmetric conflict. 
Third, other participants believed that planned contact interventions have been co-opted 
and manipulated by the State of Israel to ensure the maintenance of its power advantage. They 
suggested that planned contact interventions can be illusory and misleading and that these 
activities permit occupation structures to project the false impression that advances towards 
peace are being made even while they are working to intensify oppression. Several respondents 
alleged that, while dialogue initiatives are probably being carried out with sincerity at the local 
level, they inadvertently enable the State of Israel to divert attention away from continuing 
rights violations: they allow it to make apparently reasonable claims that it is genuinely 
committed to resolving the ongoing conflict. 
Impotency in levelling power-asymmetry. Several respondents argued that efforts to 
                                                 
 
1 During our analysis, we recognized that every ‘industry’ develops a preferred language 
utilized by insiders. This required us to search surrounding text for viewpoints that dig beneath 






balance power inside planned contact interventions were mostly symbolic, distinctly 
inadequate and, most likely, unable to effect change outside of controlled group settings. These 
respondents explained this impotency as being rooted in the deeply self-sustaining nature of 
power asymmetry because pronounced economic, social, and political benefits for ‘the 
powerful’ inside asymmetrical relationships fossilize the status quo. They pointed out that 
power relationships between partner organizations and between project participants therefore 
often replicated the status quo of occupation-inspired power asymmetry and did not model 
equalized relations. A respondent on a programme evaluation that we reviewed stated: “It 
doesn’t matter how hard you try [to create equality]; the external reality is much stronger 
(Kahanoff, Salem, Nasrallah, & Neumann, 2007)”.  
At the heart of the respondents’ critique is the common practice of conducting dialogue 
processes as if detached from the contentious political beliefs that participants carry with them 
into sessions. A typical outgrowth of this practice is the equation of Jewish Israeli participants 
and their circumstances with Palestinian participants. Some respondents who worked for 
Palestinian organizations argued that contact strategies based on a sense of equality and shared 
individual sufferings are blind to the distinct differences between the life experiences of the 
‘occupier’ and ‘occupied’. For example, Palestinians arrive at joint meetings inside East 
Jerusalem or Israel distressed by travel permit processes and invasive security procedures at 
checkpoints.   
Several respondents insisted that the power imbalance between Israeli and Palestinian 
partner organizations and staff was reinforced by Israeli partner organizations’ preferential 
access to international donor resources. A Palestinian administrator for a European donor noted 
that Israeli organizations were ‘affiliated with the West, so they are more accessible’ and 
‘internationals will listen more to the Israelis’. As a result, international funders often insist 





also extends to project design since Israeli partners typically lead bid-writing processes, which 
results in reduced Palestinian ownership of project implementation. A Palestinian community 
organization leader, experienced in joint project work, reflected that: 
‘Palestinian staff were simply doing what the Israeli leaders asked them to do, there 
was not a feeling of equality, there was little or no transparency with the Palestinian 
staff in regard to finances, and unequal budgets on different sides of the line.’ 
Neglecting the drivers of violence. The interview narratives revealed a broad perception 
that planned contact interventions are not capable of neutralizing power asymmetry due to their 
inability to rectify, and their evasion of the structural and historical drivers of violence. As 
predicted earlier (See: Abu-Nimer, 2012; Eide, 1972; Maoz, 2000b, 2000c; Phipps, 2014; 
Rouhana & Korper, 1997; Saguy & Dovidio, 2013), some respondents described how select 
planned contact interventions were avoiding ‘the hard issues’ by focusing on individual 
psychological change, discussing cultural differences between groups and providing 
entertainment programs. Furthermore, they cautioned that these sorts of initiatives were making 
local-level conflict resolution appear disingenuous. An Israeli NGO leader suggested that: 
‘If an organization does not support right of return [for refugees], it is hypocritical […] 
because they do coexistence dialogue activities, but are ignoring the fundamental rights 
abuses.’ 
Another explanation for the struggle of planned contact initiatives to address the drivers 
of violence involves their inherent inability to evidence transformation beyond the personal-
psychological level. This is a formidable critique since it disputes a fundamental claim made 
by advocates of dialogue-based methodologies – that de-politicized interactions between 
competitors will induce personal transformations which will trickle outwards and affect the 
broader socio-political conflict. This critique brings into focus disagreement over the perceived 





governmental donor, this critique is based on awareness that many ‘co-existence’ activities 
avoid difficult discussion of resolutions for root causes and find it favourable to steer dialogues 
towards issues at the personal level. A Palestinian civil society leader protested that ‘Our 
conflict is not psychology; our problem is political!’ In related fashion, an international NGO 
leader reacted against the notion that building friendships and relationships between Jewish 
Israelis and Palestinians was pre-requisite for solutions to root causes: 
‘This conflict is not about two peoples relating to each other, it is a problem of how one 
relates to the occupier.’ 
Normalizing the occupation. Taken together, the three previous critiques of planned 
contact interventions point to a final overarching problem acknowledged by a strong majority 
of our interview respondents and by several secondary data sources. The issue is that planned 
contact interventions may be associated with the normalization of the occupation. As such, 
contact-based initiatives are viewed as part of a broader strategy which ensures that oppressed 
populations accept and terminate resistance to occupation structures and processes. This view 
directly implicates planned contact interventions in maintaining the status quo of Israeli 
dominance and constraining the Palestinian self-determination movement.  
One respondents argued that the promotion of congenial relations between Palestinians 
and Jewish Israelis inside the tightening grip of occupation succeeds only in: 
‘break[ing] the mind down to accept the possibility of occupied relationships […] 
psychologically accepting the occupier’ (Palestinian activist). 
Two other participants went as far as to argue that the underlying goal of many joint 
Palestinian-Israeli activities was to assist oppressed populations in accepting the distorted logic 
of oppression. As a facet of normalization, joint interactions either aim to portray a sense of 





oppressors’ repressive actions. Several respondents said that these suspicions had provoked 
escalating resistance to these ‘normalization events’ and protests at dialogue initiatives. 
Discussion 
Our data analysis has revealed deep divisions between the arguments in favour of and 
against planned contact interventions – represented by the viewpoints of critics and advocates. 
However, we emphasize again that we did not essentialize respondents as either critics or 
advocates, but recognized that some argued for and against planned contact interventions in 
the same interview. Our respondents’ contradictory viewpoints resonate with the theoretical 
background presented earlier, that concluded with the suggestion that conflict-reducing 
approaches such as planned contact interventions may be undermining other avenues of social 
and political change that intensify conflict. In this section, our goal is to make sense of this 
theoretical and practical disagreement and outline three contentious themes that emerge from 
our research to form a grounded proposal for effective conflict resolution inside the asymmetric 
conflict. 
Scope of influence of conflict resolution 
The first component to our grounded proposal contends that, while important, 
individual identity revision is distinctly inadequate as a mode of change inside asymmetric 
conflict. Instead, strategic conflict resolution decision-making should prioritize methods that 
evidence a direct effect on both oppressive asymmetric power structures and elite-level peace 
processes (Compare with Abu-Nimer, 2012; Maoz, 2000c; Rouhana & Korper, 1997). This 
proposition is legitimated by a broad agreement in our findings that local-level transformation 
in the personal and group realms should be designed to impact the elite-political realm, 





However, respondents disagreed regarding the potential that identity changes at the 
personal and group level have to disrupt power asymmetry in this elite-political realm. 
Advocates of contact and dialogue argued that identity revisions from subversive interactions 
inside socially engineered settings can be ‘scaled up’ to shape future leaders and ‘influencers’ 
in elite-level peace processes. Critics noted that any revisions to individual identities inside 
dialogue groups are mostly overwhelmed by competing socio-political forces when they move 
beyond these insulated environments. Further, critics insisted that contact-based strategies are, 
in fact, ‘normalizing’ the status quo of state oppression. These critics favoured strategies of 
resistant collective action that intensified conflict (but not violence) and harnessed the 
legitimacy provided by global civil society and justice structures (Compare with Francis, 2010; 
Jackson, 2015). 
This component to our grounded proposal captures the essence of Curle’s (1971) model 
for harnessing conflict inside unbalanced power relationships by making planned contact 
interventions conditional on the reformation of ‘occupied’ relationships through (re)politicized 
conflict resolution initiatives to subvert status quo power relationships (See also Azar & Farah, 
1981; Jabri, 1995; Rouhana & Korper, 1997). This conditional logic reflects the inclination of 
several respondents towards local-level Palestinian-led ‘resistant’ approaches, which aligns 
with Wright and Lubensky’s (2009) observation that collective action shifts the analytical gaze 
towards subordinate groups inside conflict resolution processes. 
However, this proposal runs up against the hard reality that internationally funded 
conflict resolution practice is deeply committed to cross-communal cooperation and contact, 
based on an individualist strategy of trying to get dominant group members to like subordinate 
group members, and vice versa (Dixon, et al., 2012, p. 421).  International commitments to 
contact interventions are not surprising since contact interventions often do achieve improved 





(2009) have highlighted important contradictions within this international stance and argue that 
by reducing perceptions of discrimination contact interventions suppress motivations to 
challenge structural injustice through resistant collective action. This contradiction has been 
predicted by Jackman (1994, p. 2), who warned that dominant groups rely on subtle and 
insidious pressures, including befriending and emotionally disarming subordinates, to sustain 
the status quo of power asymmetry and advantage. 
Conflict resolution strategy 
Our second proposal suggests that transformative conflict resolution strategies should 
prioritize the levelling of power asymmetry and structural injustice by attending to the 
historical and structural drivers of asymmetric conflict (Compare with Azar & Farah, 1981; 
Francis, 2010). This proposition is supported by broad agreement amongst our respondents that 
the status quo between the State of Israel and the Palestinians is injuriously asymmetrical in 
nature, and is defined by neglected drivers of violence and insecurity on both sides. Further, 
the interview narratives revealed a broad desire to rectify these drivers, and that rectification is 
dependent on how these drivers are conceptualized. For example, ongoing violence is 
conceptualized by some as rooted in a conventional two-way conflict that suffers from religious 
and/or cultural discord, while some of our critics insisted that drivers of violence are, rather, 
rooted in an ongoing settler colonial project by the State of Israel. 
Further, our data analysis has evidenced competing ideas about the ability of contact-
based strategies to attend to these drivers of violence. Advocates of contact-based strategies 
propose an indirect course of action – utilizing information sharing and trust-building in safe 
environments to revise the identities of individuals who will then move outwards to effect 
change within their respective communities. In contrast, critics of planned contact interventions 





in the benefits of asymmetric conflict. These critics propose conflict resolution strategies that 
directly engage with occupying structures that are perpetuating difficult drivers of violence. 
The weight of academic research has traditionally supported the use of contact-based 
strategies to attend to drivers of violence (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2008). 
However, we introduced in our theoretical background strands of research within the fields of 
conflict resolution and social psychology that are propping up the viewpoints of our critics and 
suggest that contact interventions may struggle to level power asymmetry and structural 
injustice given the manner in which positive cross-communal interactions can, ironically, serve 
as an obstacle for the mobilization of subordinate groups against injustice since they weaken 
ingroup identifications (Saguy, 2017), dampen the recognition of injustice (Francis, 2010; 
Wright & Lubensky, 2009), and build trust in members of oppressive groups (Saguy, et al., 
2009). 
Agency and conflict resolution 
Our third proposition is also rooted in broad congruity in our findings and suggests that 
conflict resolution action should be designed and controlled at local levels and maintain clear 
independence from the self-interests of upper-level actors in order to dislodge the status quo of 
entrenched power asymmetry (Compare with Jabri, 1995; Schmid, 1968). Respondents 
generally agreed that a ‘local turn’ is required to yield control over conflict resolution (broadly 
speaking) to local populations and their civil societies. Conversely, if agency at the local level 
can be stifled, the status quo of asymmetric violence is likely to survive and deepen. 
However, the interview narratives noticeably diverge regarding the ability of contact-
based strategies to amass agency at the local level. One side argued that planned contact 
interventions are inherently suited to bypassing elite actors and their self-interested propensity 





to position the interests of prejudiced international donors, a stifling ‘dialogue industry’ and 
the self-interested State of Israel before their overt local-level concerns. These critics contended 
that conflict resolution should, instead, resist the distractions of external influence and 
resourcing and adopt a framework of resistant collective action that intensifies nonviolent 
conflict. 
Our contradictory findings mirror the contradictions within our theoretical background. 
Advocates agreed that contact-based strategies carry directional influence as they modify 
behaviour and shape in-group norms at the local level with a view to institutional-political 
change (Compare with Lazarus, 2011; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008), while critics 
argue that local-level agency is largely co-opted by advantaged groups who are interested in 
extending the benefits of the status quo by ignoring the preferred strategies of subordinate 
groups (Compare with Bastian, Lusher, & Ata, 2012). Because power advantage shapes both 
the type of conflict resolution strategies chosen and research conducted on resulting practices, 
our respondents argued for a shift in focus and vantage point (Compare with Wright & 
Lubensky, 2009), whereby the preferred conflict resolution strategies of the subordinate party 
are prioritized (e.g. within international funding guidelines) and control over conflict resolution 
is wrested from the distracting and distorting self-interested hands of elite-political actors in 
both Israeli and Palestinian societies. Research strategies should follow suit and promote the 
voices of subordinate populations through analysis and interpretation that fairly bypasses the 
biases of power. 
Conclusions 
A synthesis of our contradictory findings has generated a grounded proposal for conflict 
resolution inside asymmetric conflict. This proposal accentuates our critical respondents while 





the end prejudice reduction and collective action are both necessary for the building of a more 
just and egalitarian society’. While our proposal has featured substantial agreement between 
advocates and critics, it is also ambiguous – including contradictory justifications for both the 
reduction and intensification of conflict. These contradictions inevitably require practitioners 
to make difficult judgements and exclusions at the expense of other strategies for resolving 
conflict and ensuring social and political change. Our proposal certainly does not reject planned 
contact interventions outright but, rather, justifies engagement between competing viewpoints 
that may reveal solutions (Saguy, 2017; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). 
However, our proposal does highlight the viewpoint of conflict resolution practitioners 
that collective resistance is essential to unify the Palestinian population and trigger power-
levelling processes inside asymmetric conflict (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Darweish & 
Rigby, 2015; Dudouet, 2008; Schock, 2013). This viewpoint reflects suggestions in our 
theoretical background to move conflict resolution decision-making onto the laps of 
subordinate populations to better utilize strategies they believe are necessary to rectify inequity 
of power and advantage. 
The discussion in this article has pushed further than some related research (See for 
example Halabi & Sonnenschein, 2004; Maoz, 2011; Saguy, 2017) that remain faithful to 
contact interventions in the current climate of conflict, albeit with suggested revisions such as 
addressing power asymmetry within the contact experiences themselves. In contrast, several of 
our respondents propose the termination of contact events for a period during which intensified 
conflict ensures that status differences are equalized. This is certainly an unsettling viewpoint 
with significant consequences. As Dixon, et al. (2012, p. 425) point out, ‘the “tranquillity” of 
inequitable relations between groups is notoriously difficult to disturb’ (see also Wright, 2008). 
Thus, the stakes are high - the improbable prospect of equality emerging from the asymmetrical 





suppressing the insubordinate state of mind necessary for power-levelling collective action. 
The bottom line of our research is, then, that while peace and conflict resolution practitioners 
do recognize the benefits of contact interventions, they also are willing to admit that these 
interventions may sustain and not disturb the status quo of power asymmetry in Israel and 
Palestine. Thus, a re-evaluation of the preeminent status given to planned contact interventions 
and the theories of social and political change that justify their use inside asymmetrical 
relationships is certainly justified. For example, Ben David, et al. (2017) propose intragroup 
dialogue as an effective alternative. Central to this re-evaluation will be a robust examination 
of the relationship between contact-based strategies and conflict-intensifying resistant 
collective action, and a willingness to confront the contradictions that emerge when both 
strategies are practiced side-by-side inside asymmetric conflict. 
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